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The Challenges for Food Safety in
China
Current legislation is unable to protect consumers from the
consequences of unscrupulous food production
Bian Yongmin
1 After a long time fighting food shortages, China has been self-sufficient in food since
19951. But in the Action Plan on Food Safety published by China’s Ministry of Health
(MOH)  on  August  14th  20032,  the  government  classes  the  following  current  risks
relevant to food safety in China as “very serious”: 1) Food-induced illnesses remain the
supreme danger for public health; 2) New biological and chemical pollutants in food; 3)
New food technologies and materials (such as transgenic food) raise new challenges; 4)
The capacity for self-management among food producers is weak; 5) Food terrorism; 6)
Slow food safety supervision by government organs. A number of scandals during 2002
illustrate  the  severity  of  the  situation3.  The  government  is  facing  pressure  from
consumer demand for safe food4. Moreover, since China’s accession to the World Trade
Organisation (WTO), food imports and exports have increased, and disputes about food
safety have arisen between China and its trading partners. The European Union has
refused Chinese food many times for reasons of safety5. These refusals not only cause
huge losses  of  goods,  they also discourage future transactions.  How to ensure food
safety has as a consequence become a government priority.
Historical background
2 In  1965  China  promulgated  its  first  food  safety  law—the  Regulations  on  the
Administration  of  Food  Hygiene  (Trial  Implementation).  These  regulations  mainly
referred to state-owned food producers. The main concern at this time was the security
of the food supply rather than the safety of the food itself, and came shortly after the
terrible Three-Year Famine6. These first regulations failed however, due to the collapse
of the legal system in China in the decade following7. 
3 Before the end of 1970s, China’s economy was strictly planned and controlled by the
state.  All  food  production  factories  were  owned  and  controlled  by  the  state,  and
observed some simple food standards. There were few food safety problems because
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most  food  was  produced  using  traditional  methods  without  heavy  use  of  chemical
fertilisers, pesticides and additives. Profits were not the aim food producers because
the entire food production chain, from the materials, equipment and technologies, to
distribution and sale, were centrally planned and controlled by the state. Food safety
accidents were occasional, but did not damage the overall image of food safety.
4 Following the Cultural Revolution and with the economic reforms at the end of 1970s,
many new laws and regulations were renewed or enacted. In 1979 the Regulations on
the  Administration  of  Food  Hygiene  was  drafted.  They  were  based  on  the  1965
Regulations and took into account the new economic situation. Three years later, the
new regulations were replaced by a new version in 1982. This was the Food Hygiene
Law. This was also a trial implementation to accommodate the situation of continuing
economic reforms was still  underway and frequent policy changes.  The revised and
current Food Hygiene Law was implemented in 1995.
 
The government is trying to use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides
© Imaginechina
5 This paper will outline China’s current legislation on food safety and evaluate its role as
well as problems arising from it. We will look first at the law on the safety of “straight”
food,  and  then  at  that  on  genetically  modified  (GM)  food.  A  commentary  on the
enforcement  of  food  safety  law  will  follow  and  on  the  implications  of  China’s
experience for other developing countries. 
Current legislation
6 The 1995 Food Hygiene Law forms the basis of the legal framework for food safety in
China.  Ironically  perhaps,  neither  the  1995  Food Hygiene  Law nor  its  predecessors
provide  a  definition  for  “food  hygiene”.  In  the  1982  Food  Hygiene  Law  the  main
concerns with regard to hygiene focused on rotten or dirty food or food capable of
causing poisoning, or food processing that was not clean. However, the scope of the
1995 Food Hygiene Law is not limited only to food hygiene problems; it  also covers
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many safety issues, such as food made with new materials, food in hospitals, food for
infants8 etc. 
The 1995 Food Hygiene Law 
7 The 1995 Food Hygiene Law, promulgated by the National People’s Congress, consists of
57 articles that cover general principles, food hygiene, food additives, packaged and
containers of food, the enactment of regulations and hygiene standards on food, the
administration  of  food  hygiene,  the  supervision  of  food  hygiene,  penalties,  and
miscellaneous clauses including definitions. It adds 12 new articles to the 1982 Food
Hygiene  Law,  and  makes  clear  stipulations  on  the  authority  responsible  for  the
administration  of  food  hygiene9,  the  supervision  of  food  hygiene  by  NGOs  and
individuals,  the production of food, food that may not be produced, the absence of
drugs in food, and on food for military and the services, etc. Seven new requirements
state that10:
• the layout of equipment and the processing methods should be reasonable; 
• food containers must always be clean;
• the instruments for storage, shipment, loading and unloading must be safe and do not
constitute a hazard;
• ready-to-eat food must be packed using materials that are clean and safe; 
• the workers must wash their hands and put on clean clothes and headwear before producing
or selling food; 
• the water used must meet the standards set by the state; and
• the wash and disinfectant products used must be safe for human consumption and use. 
8 The above are all crucial to ensuring the safety of an end product, but it is disputable
whether these requirements are sufficient, or even exhaustive. For example, Article 8
(4) provides that ready-to-eat food should be packed with materials that are clean and
safe for use: but no mention is made of the packaging used for ready-made food. This is
quite typical of the articles contained in 1995 Food Hygiene Law, which covers only
very basic practices.
9 Reference to planting and breeding, as these have relevance to food hygiene, is absent.
So  the  law  does  not  take  a  from-land-to-table  approach.  The  inclusion  of  certain
ingredients in food is illegal only when the ingredients affect the nutrition or hygiene
of the food. So to mix a second grade rice with a top grade rice and sell the mix as top
grade rice is not illegal under this law because both may be nutritious and hygienic. Of
course rice sold in such a way is illegal according to other laws, such as contract law.
The method of enumeration adopted in this law to provide rules in a few key articles
barely covers the extent and requirements of actual practice.
10 The 1995 Food Hygiene Law did not establish a system to deal with major food safety
incidents, such as the outbreak of bird flu in China in the spring of 2004. Although the
government quickly enacted a series of orders upon the occurrence of the bird flu, it
remains unclear in law what would be required were another food safety incident to
occur of a similar nature or on a similar scale. 
Other regulations
11 Many food hygiene  regulations  were  formulated in  accordance  with  the  1995  Food
Hygiene  Law,  which  generally  covers  the  following  five  areas:  1)  food  and  raw
materials, including administrative measures on food additives, transgenic food, milk,
egg,  meat  and  related  products  thereof,  aquatic  products,  food  made  from  new
resources11, etc.; 2) food production and processing, which focuses for example on food
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disinfection;  3)  food  packaging,  containers  and  equipment;  4)  supervision  and
administrative penalties; 5) food inspection and testing. 
12 It  is  very  difficult  to  evaluate  these  regulations  and their  effectiveness  in  practice.
Regulations that can be enacted by ministries are called guizhang. The administrative
organs would enact new guizhang in order to deal with a new problem, but without
checking carefully whether they were in agreement with effective laws or regulations
enacted  by  the  same  administrative  organ  or  by  other  administrative  organs  with
jurisdiction in the same area. Thus, conflict among guizhang provisions is not rare. 
Standards 
13 The  system  of  food  hygiene  standards  is  complicated.  There  are  basically  two
categories  of  food  hygiene  standards—compulsory  and  voluntary.  Most  compulsory
standards are  established by the state;  however,  local  government has  the right  to
formulate local standards that do not conflict with national standards, or when there
are no national standards. 
14 When  the  government  formulates  a  compulsory  standard,  it  refers  to  foreign  and
international  standards,  such  as  the  food  code  developed  by  Codex  Alimentarius
founded  jointly  by  the  Food  and  Agriculture  Organisation  and  the  World  Health
Organisation (Codex). But referring to the Codex does not mean that China is adopting
the  Codex.  The  level  of  protection  depends  to  a  large  extent  on  the  capacities  of
Chinese producers, especially with regard to their technical and financial capabilities,
and trade interests of the state. In the 1980s, the majority of food producers were either
unable or could not afford to produce food that met Codex standards. 
15 Trade interests  also play a role  in determining the level  of  standards.  For food for
which China is mainly a net exporting state, the government is inclined to set a low
standard that is easy for exporters to reach. Up to 2000 only 14.6% of food hygiene
standards  met  those  of  the  Codex12.  Before  entering  the  WTO,  China  made  many
adjustments to laws and standards in accordance with the provisions of the WTO. In the
field of food hygiene standards, the government reviewed 464 standards and identified
1,379 issues13.  It made huge modifications, raising standards, especially those on the
limits  of  pesticide  residues,  85.4%  of  which  now  meet  Codex  requirements14.  In
addition, 81% of the standards on pollutants met Codex standards15. On the other hand,
where Chinese food producers are capable of producing very safe food, or areas in the
food industry where China is mainly a net import market, the government sets food
standards even higher than those of the Codex. 
16 Both the government and NGOs, i.e., various chambers of commerce which, according
to the Chinese law,  are non-governmental  organisations,  can recommend voluntary
standards to food producers. These standards focus on many areas of food. Some of
them relate  to  food safety,  which may help food producers  increase  their  share in
domestic or export food markets. With the improvement of technology and financial
ability,  more and more food producers adopt many voluntary standards which may
lead to better market success.
17 Among  all  the  voluntary  standards,  the  Green  Food  programme  deserves  much
attention.  The green food programme was launched by the Ministry  of  Agriculture
(MOA) in 1992. Two categories of green food, AA and A, are defined by it. AA green food
has the same standard for organic food. For example, GM ingredients are not permitted
to be used in the production of AA green food. But as much of the land in China is
heavily polluted with pesticides or other pollutants, it is not only expensive but also
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very difficult to produce. Category A green food was created to provide safe food based
on the reality of China’s natural environment. A green food is of a higher standard than
normal food but lower than AA green food or organic food. For example, only limited
amounts of pesticide and chemical fertilisers may be used in crop elevation in order to
be considered “safe” without affecting yield. The environment, including the land, air
and water, where crops are planted or animals live should also meet certain conditions.
18 The green food programme did not develop well in its first few years. Yet, with the
export of “normal” food having to meet safety requirements and consumers becoming
more  aware  and  more  cautious  about  food  safety,  green  food  has  become  more
popular16.  Growing exports of green food motivated the government to promote the
expansion of green food production17. 
19 The development of a green food industry may have implications for the agricultural
policies  of  other  developing  countries.  Organic  food  is  too  expensive  for  most
consumers, even for consumers in developed countries. It cannot therefore be the main
direction  for  the  development  of  agriculture.  On  the  other  hand,  the  health  risks
associated with the heavy use of chemical fertilisers and pesticides are clear. Green
food is a compromise. The cost to produce it is not too high, while the use of chemical
fertilisers  and  pesticides  is  permitted  but  heavily  restricted  to  ensure  yield  and  a
guaranteed level of food safety. 
Genetically modified food 
20 Chinese  scientists  began  studying  transgenic  technology  in  the  early  1980s18.  They
convinced  senior  Chinese  leaders  of  the  potential  for  genetic  modification  in
agriculture19 when China was still struggling with food shortages. In the early 1990s the
first  transgenic plant,  tobacco,  was planted in several  large areas.  At  that  time the
planting of transgenic tobacco in China was carried out on an unprecedented scale for
transgenic plants in the world20. Hebei province trial planted a transgenic cotton with
seeds provided by the Monsanto Corporation in 199521. Later two bio-technology joint
ventures with Monsanto were set up in Hebei and Anhui provinces. Now in China a
total ten GM plants are being trialled22. and six may be produced commercially—two
kinds of  cotton,  two kinds of  tomato,  pimiento and an ornamental  named Morning
Glory23. In 2001 about 600 thousand hectares were planted with GM organisms (GMO)24.
The decisions to develop and plant GMOs were made solely by the government with no
consultation with the public or with academia.
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Workers engaged in the production or sale of foodstuffs are legally required to cover their hair
© Imaginechina
21 In 1993 the former State Science and Technology Commission (now the Ministry of
Science and Technology) promulgated the Administrative Regulations on the Safety of
Genetic Engineering, China’s first biosafety-related regulations on genetic engineering.
According to Article 1, the purposes of the regulations were to promote research and
development in genetic modification, strengthen safety management,  protect public
health  and  the  health  of  personnel  engaged  in  genetic  modification,  prevent
environmental pollution, and maintain ecological balance. It contains no provision for
the control over transgenic product imports. GM foods were imported into China as
normal food before 2002.
22 The  importation  of  GM  food  into  China  has  increased  year  on  year  since  199625.
Enormous  imports  of  American  soybeans  had  a  serious impact  on  Chinese  farmers
whose livelihood depends on soybean production26. It is a foreseeable result of China’s
entry into the WTO, that the importation of US-produced GM foods will continue to
increase. With more and more GM food finding its way onto the tables of consumers,
the problem of safety has been raised. Hence the government has enacted regulations
to administrate, inter alia, the safety of imported GM food.
The regulations on the safety of GM food
23 In  May  2001,  The  Regulations  on  the  Administration  of  the  Safety  of  Transgenic
Agricultural  Products  (RASTAP)  were  promulgated.  This  is  an  important  piece  of
legislation. All transgenic organisms, including plants, animals and micro organisms,
whether imported to, exported from or transited through China, are subject to these
regulations. According to an order of the State Council, RASTAP should enter into force
on their date of promulgation27. This stipulation conflicts with the WTO’s transparency
rules. However, China was not a member of the WTO in May 2001. The United States
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was the first  to  show dissatisfaction with the way that  RASTAP entered into force.
Moreover, several of their provisions are ambiguous, in particular the evaluation of the
safety of GMOs and their labelling, etc. Due to the above RASTAP did not enter into
force on the date provided. As authorised by RASTAP, the MOA is responsible for the
supervision and administration of the safety of GMOs. To enforce RASTAP, it enacted
three  sets  of  administrative  measures  in  January  2002,  which  laid  down  detailed
provisions  on  the  safety,  import  and  labelling  of  transgenic  agricultural  products.
These measures became effective on March 20th 2002. 
24 RASTAP and its measures, require the application of two methods to control the safety
of  transgenic  products  in  international  trade.  First,  Chinese  importers  or  foreign
exporters must apply for the transgenic products which may be imported later to be
risk  assessed.  The  Committee  on  the  Safety  of  Agricultural  Transgenic  Organisms,
which is affiliated to the MOA, is responsible for accepting this application, but may
only do so twice a year. It must complete the assessment and respond to the applicant
within nine months from the date of acceptance. Second, foreign exporters must label
their transgenic products.
25 The three sets of measures were promulgated only two months prior to their effective
date, causing many difficulties for importers of GMOs. Since risk assessments take nine
months, it was impossible for importers to obtain the certificates required on the date
of  effect.  The  MOA had to  make a  transitional  arrangement  if  it  did  not  want  the
importation of GMOs, especially of soybean, to be halted. Therefore, on March 11th
2002  the  MOA promulgated  the  Temporary  Measures  on  the  Administration  of  the
Safety of Transgenic Agricultural Products (TMASTAP), according to which exporters of
GMOs to China could apply for temporary certificates based on the documents issued in
their own countries. TMASTAP’s provisions were to expire on December 20th 2002. But
“for technical reasons”, their period of validity was extended to September 20th 200328.
On July 16th 2003, as stated by the MOA, again for technical reasons, this period was
further extended to April 24th 200429. With no new measures due to be published, this
may be extended again. 
26 The  extent  of  trading  interests  in  GMOs  is  considerable,  and  this  explains  the
complexity  of  the  GMO  situation  for  China,  the  safety  issues  and  the  technology
involved and the “technical  reasons” claims made by the government.  China is  the
biggest importer of soybeans. It imported 11.3 million tons of soya in 200230. The trade
value of soya between the United States and China is about US$1 billion31, and imports
were expected to increase in 2003. 
Enforcement Distorted administrative regime
27 In China there is no unified administrative organ with the authority to deal with all the
issues relating to food safety. The MOH seems to be the most important organ for the
governing of  food safety,  however,  the MOA, the General  Administration of  Quality
Supervision,  Inspection and Quarantine (GAQSIQ),  State  Administration for  Industry
and  Commence  (SAIC),  the  State  Environmental  Protection  Administration,  the
Ministry of Commerce (MOC, formerly the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-
operation), and the State Grain Administration, etc. also have jurisdiction over food
issues, and/or supervise food producers. All these organs need to make detailed rules to
tackle the issues in relation to their remit as well as within the scope of their respective
powers. This is one reason why the 1995 Food Hygiene Law does not provide rules for
planting  and  breeding,  which  are  the  responsibility  of  the  MOA.  The  1993
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Administrative Measures on the Safety of Transgenic Engineering is silent on trade of
transgenic  products  as  this  is  the  remit  of  the  Ministry  of  Commerce.  In  fact
superfluous laws and regulations impair rather than enhance administration on food
safety, and increase law enforcement costs, leaving food producers confused.
28 The involvement of  so many authorities  also cause problems of  co-ordination from
enactment  to  enforcement.  The  State  Food  and  Drug Administration  (SFDA)  was
instituted in 2003, with the mandate, inter alia, to integrate the administration and
supervision of food safety, co-ordinate and organise investigation and impose penalties
for serious violations of the law. The SFDA, however, has no teeth. Its powers relating
to food safety are held by other ministries and agencies, while the SFDA itself is a semi-
ministry.  It  has  to  co-ordinate  among  several  ministries  that  have  a  higher
administrative  rank.  When  there  is  a  conflict  between  these  organs,  the  SFDA’s
decisions or opinions have no power and are unlikely to be executed. 
29 So  far  its  main  progress  made  relating  to  food  safety  is  its  Food  and  Drug  Safety
Reassurance  Programme,  which  demands  that  the  MOA,  MOH,  GAQSIQ,  SAIC, MOC,
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and the General Administration of Customs (CGA)
should, within their respective scope, take steps to ensure food safety32. Yet it is almost
impossible for the SFDA to successfully fulfil its co-ordination mission while so much
overlap and separate jurisdictions remain. 
30 For example, the MOH is entitled to grant a hygiene licence to a food producer, which is
an essential measure to ensure food safety. Meanwhile, since 2002 GAQSIQ has been
entitled to grant safety licences to food producers. In the MOH’s view GAQSIQ’s safety
licences are unnecessary.  After  the MOA published several  administrative measures
relating to GMOs, the MOH also enacted The Administrative Measures on the Hygiene
of GM Food. In fact, different organs often make their own plans relating to food safety,
a situation where overlap or conflict is common.
31 Green Food is  governed by  the  Centre  of  Green Food,  affiliated  to  the  MOA,  while
organic  food  is  governed  by  the  Centre  of  Organic  Food,  affiliated  to  the  State
Environmental Protection Administration33. The standards for Class AA green food are
almost the same as those for organic food. In practice they compete with each other.
This  situation is  wasteful  of  the  resources  of  the  state.  Similarly,  the  safety  of  GM
agricultural products is governed by the MOA, while the safety of normal food products
is governed by the MOH. 
32 This disordered situation will  not easily be improved in the near future,  because it
relates  to  the  redistribution  of  powers  among  different  organs,  a  difficult  move.
Moreover,  the administration of food is  in itself  especially difficult,  particularly for
China, with the world’s largest population.
Inefficient administration through punishment
33 The main administrative  work done by administrative  organs  is  inspecting,  several
times a year, compliance with the Food Hygiene Law. The government does not attach
enough  importance  to  supervise  the  course  of  food  production,  or  to  help  food
producers increase their own capacity to ensure food safety. Most inspection work is
about finding and punishing those food producers that break the law. The 1995 Food
Hygiene Law does not prescribe the obligations of food producers to ensure food safety,
yet penalties for breach are clearly stipulated. In 2002 such inspections covered 98% of
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food producers34. Those found to be involved in illegal activity were punished, fined or
had their licences revoked, etc..
34 Other schemes or programmes which may work well to enhance food safety, such as
taking a from-land-to-table approach, recalling of products not meeting standards, etc.,
and enhancing the traceability of food, etc. Penalties per se are neither an effective nor
sufficient means of ensuring food safety. Solely announcing that the banning of certain
pesticides  will  not  guarantee  food  safety.  Such  pesticides  must  be  recalled  and
destroyed to ensure their trade and use cannot continue.
Trade interests
35 The improvement of food safety is not only driven by safety concerns, but also by trade
interests.  Although  this  may  not  be  true  in  all  countries  (it  is  the  case  in  many
countries),  China  seems  to  give  more  weight  to trade.  One  purpose  of  the
administration of food hygiene is to support food exportation because China produces
more agricultural products than it needs35. In accordance with the Action Plan on Food
Safety published by the MOH in September 2003, the government will “modify food
safety  regulations  and  standards  from  time  to  time  to  ensure  that  food  hygiene
regulations  and  standards  meet  the  needs  of  food  importation  and  exportation  to
protect  consumer  health”36.  This  approach  may  be  typical  in  many  developing
countries.
36 The enforcement of GM safety regulations sheds light on China’s concerns about trade
interests in the field of food safety. After the promulgation of The Administrative
Labelling Measures, the MOA published the first list of GMO to be labelled37. On this
important list, only five categories of transgenic organisms, soya38,  maize39,  cotton40,
tomato41 and rapeseeds42, are required to be labelled. Even for these five categories, not
all products that include them must be labelled. Take soya as an example. According to
this list, only five soya products required labelling. Soy milk, soy sauce and beancurd
are not included. If safety were top priority, labelling of all food containing a certain
percentage  of  GMO  ingredients  would  be  required.  Soy  sauce  and  beancurd  are
consumed extensively in China. Made using certain traditional Chinese methods, they
are seldom imported from other countries. But if this is why they are not required to be
labelled even if made using transgenic soya, the government’s concern about GMOs
seems disingenuous. 
37 The  2002  Administrative  Labelling  Measures  also  have  application  to  imported
products. However, until the summer of 2003, the government did not inspect products
in its domestic market for compliance with the labelling measures43. It was found that
almost all transgenic soy oil producers breached this labelling rule before they were
forced to comply through this inspection. But other GM food remained unlabelled in
supermarkets up to the end of 2003. 
38 In addition, the Administrative Labelling Measures did not clearly specify the minimum
amount of any one transgenic ingredient in a product before this must be labelled.
Thus it is not clear whether a mix of transgenic products with traditional products shall
be  labelled.  Such  mixing  is  more  frequent  in  domestic  products  than  in  imported
products.
Problems associated with rapid industrialisation
39 Although the government has done much to enforce and supervise the application of
the food hygiene law, the food safety situation in China today remains unsatisfactory.
In 2001 more than 19,000 people were poisoned in 611 food poisoning cases44. In 2002
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more than 11,000 people were poisoned in 464 food poisoning cases45. It is surprising
that most poisoning cases occurred in families46 due to unsafe food products.
40 A large amount of unsafe foods are produced in areas that are no more rural but not yet
urban, where the governance from both countryside and cities is weak. Following the
process of industrialisation, cities expand as do the areas between the countryside and
cities. However, governance by the municipal administrations has not yet expanded
accordingly to the boundary of cities, on the other hand, the governance of villages is
rapidly declining as farmers are losing their land. Many illegal food producers rent
houses  in  these  special  areas  to  produce or  process  food and sell  them in the city
markets. 
 
In the gray zones between town and country the authorities often lack authority
© Imaginechina
41 The case of “swill oil” (ganshui you) or “drain oil” (digou you) is typical47. It is said that
in the suburbs of Peking alone, there may be more than 1,000 producers refining this
kind of oil. Some producers may have been there for more than thirty years although
the Peking Administration of Environmental Protection has cracked down many times.
Moreover, to deal with one case of oil from swill, several organs have to act together,
because the MOH is in charge of swill, the AEP is in charge of waste water and SAIC is in
charge of business licences. This also explains how the problem of over-administration
impedes the administration of food safety. 
42 Now the SFDA has decided to enhance the administration in the grey zones between the
cities  and  the  countryside.  But  so  far  there  are  no  special  measures  targeting
administration in this jumbled area.
43 The MOH published a very ambitious Action Plan for Food Safety,  which sets out a
series  of  goals  for  food  safety  to  be  reached  before  or  by  200848.  But  it  is  highly
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questionable as to whether the MOH can bring food safety to all Chinese with its limited
powers and under the current legal framework for food safety.
44 The 1995 Food Hygiene Law does not cover planting and breeding, which are the remit
of the MOA. Nevertheless, the use of pesticides and chemical fertilisers in planting and
animal medicines and hormones in breeding has caused many problems in agricultural
products. China is the largest consumer of chemical fertilisers in the world49. Pesticides
are heavily used in planting, of them 70% are very poisonous50. Several pesticides now
forbidden  in  the  European  Union  are  still  in  use  in  China51.  Pesticide  residues  on
vegetables are so common and so dense that many hygiene experts suggest washing
vegetables first then dunking them in hot water before cooking or eating them52. The
power to administrate chemical fertilisers, pesticides and animal medicines is in the
hands  of  the  MOA,  who  is  also  the  main  user  and  beneficiary.  The  MOA  should
supervise the process of planting and breeding. The new Regulations on the Safety of
Agricultural Products, which are still in their early stage of drafting, are to be enacted
by the authority.
45 Although the chain from land to table has been cut into several administrative sections,
the MOH seems decided to do its best in its own section. The 1995 Food Hygiene Law
provides some important rules to ensure food safety in a simple way, something that
easily causes confusion in their implementation. Now the MOH has determined to enact
detailed  regulations  for  the  implementation  of  the  1995  Food  Hygiene  Law  during
2004-553.  A  series  of  regulations  and  normative  documents  have  been  put  on  the
legislative  agenda  by  the  MOH,  including  The  Administrative  Rules  on  Sample
Inspections of Food Hygiene, The Administrative Rules on Nutrition Labelling on Food,
amending  and  publishing  316  food  standards  and  enacting  new  standards  such  as
standards on the maximum of residues of 19 chemical pollutants in various agricultural
products and food, etc.54.
46 Over-administration,  where  several  organs  have  the  power  to  administrate  the
production  and  sale  of  food,  will  remain  the  most  difficult  problem  in  the
implementation  and  supervision  of  food  safety  law  and  regulations.  It  is  a  major
challenge  for  the  state  to  establish  a  mechanism  that  will  enable  different
bureaucracies to work efficiently and effectively in co-operation. Just like in the above-
mentioned  swill  case,  if  the  relative  organs  cannot  act  at  the  same  time,  illegal
producers will escape. 
47 There were a total 382,737 food producing or processing entities in China in 200255.
Most  were  medium-sized  or  small,  from  which  most  food  with  safety  problems
originated. Although Chinese are becoming rich, the average income of urban residents
is only 716 yuan (US$86) a month56, which is much higher than that of rural residents.
The large number of low income residents are a stable contingent and major consumers
of  poor  quality  food.  “Swill  oil”  is  targeted  at  such  consumers.  In  2002  the  MOH
inspected 505,084  food producers57 including cafeterias  and restaurants  nationwide,
13.68% of those inspected were found in breach of the law58. Given China’s vast size,
how  to  supervise  so  many  small  food  producers  is  a  massive  challenge  for  the
government. This is a common challenge for most developing countries, where most
food producers are medium-sized or small businesses, lacking the ability and resources
to implement self-management in food safety.
48 China began to regulate food safety immediately following the resolution of its food
shortages. Yet China has not established a legal system efficient in ensuring food safety.
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Many  problems  are  rooted  in  the  administration  regime  and  China’s  priority  of
economic  development.  Following  China’s  integration  into  the  international
community, food safety in China has already improved. However, a lot of work still
needs to be done both in terms of legislation and implementation.
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